Thinking about thinking about time-ERRATUM. Refining the bigger picture: On the integrative memory model. Representational formats in medial temporal lobe and neocortex also determine subjective memory features. The integrative memory model is detailed, but skimps on false memories and development. Entities also require relational coding and binding. Improving the integrative memory model by integrating the temporal dynamics of memory. What face familiarity feelings say about the lateralization of specific entities within the core system. How do memory modules differentially contribute to familiarity and recollection? Priming recognition memory test cues: No evidence for an attributional basis of recollection. The subjective experience of recollection and familiarity in Alzheimer's disease. Cognitive control constrains memory attributions. There is more to memory than recollection and familiarity. The role of anxiety in the integrative memory model. Two processes are not necessary to understand memory deficits. Understanding misidentification syndromes using the integrative memory model. The role of reference frames in memory recollection. Fluency: A trigger of familiarity for relational representations? Dual processes in memory: Evidence from memory of time-of-occurrence of events. Episodic memory is emotionally laden memory, requiring amygdala involvement. The other side of the coin: Semantic dementia as a lesion model for understanding recollection and familiarity. The ventral lateral parietal cortex in episodic memory: From content to attribution. Cutting out the middleman: Separating attributional biases from memory deficits. Global matching and fluency attribution in familiarity assessment. Interactions with the integrative memory model. Self-sacrifice for ingroup's history: A diachronic perspective—ERRATUM. Evolutionary-developmental modeling of neurodiversity and psychopathology. Reductionist thinking and animal models in neuropsychiatric research. Beyond trait reductionism: Implications of network structures for dimensional models of psychopathology. The adaptive self: Culture and social flexibility in feedback networks. Beyond reduction with the representation: The need for causality with full complexity to unravel mental health. Symptoms are not the solution but the problem: Why psychiatric research should focus on processes rather than symptoms. Networks, intentionality and multiple realizability: Not enough to block reductionism. Indeed, not really a brain disorder: Implications for reductionist accounts of addiction. Conceptualizing neurodevelopmental disorders as networks: Promises and challenges. The value of clinical and translational neuroscience approaches to psychiatric illness. Functional disorders can also be explained through a non-reductionist application of network theory. Therapy and prevention for mental health: What if mental diseases are mostly not brain disorders? Network models can help focus research on the role of culture and context in psychopathology, but don't discount latent variable models. The network takeover reaches psychopathology. Making a case for constructive reductionism. Neither biological nor symptomatology reductionism: A call for integration in psychopathology research. Getting to the bottom of things: The value of evolutionary approaches in discerning the origin of psychopathology. Brain networks require a network-conscious psychopathological approach. Reductionism - simplified and scientific. Elimination, not reduction: Lessons from the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) and multiple realisation. Brain networks for emotion and cognition: Implications and tools for understanding mental disorders and pathophysiology. Taking an engineer's view: Implications of network analysis for computational psychiatry. Special, radical, failure of reduction in psychiatry. Intentional content in psychopathologies requires an expanded interpretivism. Why not be pluralists about explanatory reduction?